This originally appeared on DCJournal.com
The latest sequence of events in Niger is a reminder that the war in Ukraine (and sanctions against Russia) is not about a fight for democracy.
The takeover in Niger by soldiers belonging to the presidential guard is the latest in a string of coups in Africa that obviously challenge the concept of democracy. There were two successful coup attempts in Burkina Faso in 2022, alongside failed coup attempts in Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Sao Tome and Principe.
There were six coup attempts in 2021, of which four —in Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan — were successful.
African Union officials and some neighboring governments have expressed concern. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, with barely two months on the job, had taken the lead on forging regional efforts via the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to free detained president Mohamed Bazoum and reinstate the democratically elected Nigerien government.
Yet, he gave an ultimatum to the governing junta in Niger — effectively step down or face ECOWAS troops — and ultimately caved when a majority of the Nigerian political spectrum opposed his efforts with supporters outside Nigeria speaking softly into the wind.
The United States and France each reportedly have 1,000-plus troops in Niger spread across multiple bases. The Americans also launch drones from Air Base 201 (known locally as “Base Americaine”). The country has been a vital counterterrorism partner in the Sahel for the American and French military.
Political leaders depict the Russian war with Ukraine as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism. The language from European leaders underlines this sense of urgency in the fight for democracy against the oppression of Russia.
Across the Atlantic, democracy is synonymous with freedom in American vocabulary, and the discourse in support of democracy instinctively stirs political and moral support from both sides of the aisle.
For many people, democracy is not equivalent to freedom. Many countries do not have a democracy, and local citizens and ex-pats are OK with that.
The war in Ukraine would theoretically be wrong in the eyes of European and Western leaders if Ukraine was not a democracy. The war should violate the same norms and seemingly draw in the same parties along their current lines.
The language of fighting for democracy further undermines efforts to expand the coalition of countries supporting a resolution to this conflict. Countries like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are not democracies, but they will be at the center of any potential solution to the Russian-Ukraine situation. (And let’s appreciate that the United States and Europe would defend the UAE and Saudi Arabia if they were invaded.)
Many diplomats (behind closed doors) will suggest that some countries lack the societal values (or will) compatible with sustaining a democracy. Some critics question the sustainability of American democracy amid the changes in its society and growing polarization.
This view helps to explain the world’s reluctance to intervene in the Sahel.
First, the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso received the standard “deeply concerned” messages from the United States and other parties with significant behind-the-scenes talks with the juntas. They did not spark the same potential for an invasion of foreign forces (regional or international) to reinstate the prior government.
Second, Niger matters more for Western diplomacy as President Bazoum was the friendly face in a tough neighborhood. Russia’s Wagner group is embedded in Chad, Libya and Mali, which border Niger, and potentially have a deal to assist neighboring Burkina Faso. If Niger accepts Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s offer to help the military junta secure the country, then the Sahel, in the eyes of the United States and France, would be lost to Russian influence. Furthermore, losing access to bases in Niger would undercut American and French efforts to fight ISIS in the Sahel.
Third, and most important, the rise of military coups doesn’t indicate a specific party as an enemy. There is no invasion of a “weaker” country by a “stronger” country (unless Nigeria dared to go at it alone to restore the Nigerien president to office, which President Tinubu has no intention of doing). The United States and France are equally aware of the bad public relations and imagery that any invasion by either country alone or in a coalition would create in the region.
Furthermore, sending troops for Bazoum would only generate questions and criticism. Why were troops not sent to reinstate President Kabore in Burkina Faso in 2022 or during the multiple coups in Mali in the last 10 years?
American presidents have learned the hard way that a fight for democracy will draw you into conflicts that you may want to avoid. A few presidents probably would acknowledge that the American version of democracy was a poorly tailored suit for some societies.
The war in Ukraine and the attempted coups in the Sahel will unlikely end tomorrow. Those opposed to these conflicts must reconsider the narrative and values underpinning Western efforts in each scenario to create better congruence around responses (in other words, improved coalition building) and avoid being stuck in wars without exit plans (Afghanistan).
Democracy can be a binding value. Freedom has sticking power … but freedom to what extent? Stopping oppression is too broad as oppression is too loosely employed in American political speech.
Stopping the invasion of one country by another is clearly something to support. How much further should our values extend beyond that? Should we be bothered by coup attempts in every country? Or only a specific set of countries? Or should our concern be transactional … i.e., how does this affect my country?
That is the bigger unknown with Niger and similar situations. Building a coalition of partners requires binding principles and a narrative behind their importance.
Purely saving democracy or elected leaders is not an all-encompassing principle for responding to a conflict, including that every country is not a democracy.
We are stuck with a question raised at the recent ECOWAS meetings: What would ECOWAS (and the world) do if a coup happened in democratic Nigeria or Cote d’Ivoire tomorrow? Sit idle, send troops, or …?
