The Democratic Love Triangle
France is “America’s oldest friend and ally” with a relationship “built upon [..] shared commitment to the same values – democracy, human rights, the rule of law, security, and prosperity.”
The words from the state department sound appropriate and nice…but the question remains open on whether the U.S. will (or should) elevate France to be its most trusted ally in Western Europe.
In American military circles, the French are known for their excellence and connectivity at the highest political levels…while their politicians are known to be savvy networkers with a strong ability to maintain and leverage connectivity in former French colonies, particularly in some challenging regions of the world. If this was a tinder profile for alliances, there would not be a swipe left.
The debacle of last month regarding submarine sales by the U.S. to Australia and a subsequent voiding of a French contract with Australia raises questions about the French-American alliance. Yet an assessment of the other two options in Europe – the U.K. and Germany – suggests France and the U.S. are made for each other.
The U.K. and Boris Johnson…
The recent trip by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to the U.S involved a lot of jabbing at France and other forms of British humor with American officials.
Johnson is known for being light-hearted thus he unsurprisingly used jokes to highlight the U.K.’s conspicuous inclusion in the submarine deal with Australia and the United States juxtaposed with the absence of France. While that was a victory for the U.K., Johnson still sounded partially annoyed that Biden disregarded his country’s views on the exit from Afghanistan.
Furthermore, a trade deal between the United States and the U.K. also feels far away. Although not a big surprise, the lack of a deal undermines the essence of Brexit, i.e. the U.K.’s ability to negotiate favorable trade deals for itself outside the European Union (E.U.).
A couple British newspapers suggested that Johnson’s administration may attempt to join the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico…the U.K.’s entrance would solely be a mechanism to backdoor the U.K. into a trade deal with the U.S., considering the U.K.’s existing trade agreements with Canada and Mexico.
Johnson is also at odds with President Joe Biden on Northern Ireland. Johnson would like to have the issue on the backburner but it is a point of contention that has some political resonance in the U.S.
For Johnson, the focus is more on getting small wins and staying friendly but a lack of a trade deal and Northern Ireland are not a (quick) winning combo for a non-E.U. country still in the midst of creating a post-Brexit personality and economic structure.
Germany with Angela Merkel…
When President Biden first walked into the White House in January, as the story goes, he wanted his first call to a foreign leader to be with German Chancellor Merkel as an indication of the American return to transatlantic normality with Europe. The chancellor declined because she had other ‘relaxing plans’, including tending to her vegetable garden and walking the lake.
The cooling of the transatlantic relationship during the Merkel years is partially understated…Berlin is still an ally of Washington but a gap has emerged between policy objectives. The haste withdrawal from Afghanistan by the Biden administration reminded Germany (and the greater Europe) that the U.S. will move at its own pace (and from time to time in a drastically different direction).
For Germans and Merkel, the U.S can be fickle with the list of common interests occasionally overridden by U.S. national security interests and economic mishaps. It was the latter in the 2008 financial crisis that both disillusioned Merkel and provided the world an opportunity to see her unifying style (of, at least, Europe).
Merkel also became a closer ally with China, adopting a unique ability to criticize the totalitarian one-party state while ensuring a strong economic alliance, with China being Germany’s largest trading partner. Merkel also backed a far-reaching energy deal with Russia. She could partially be excused for her strategy as former President Trump displayed open hostility for her throughout his term and generally side-lined Germany as an ally (…remember President Trump considered withdrawing a significant portion of troops from Germany).
Today, it appears that the German administration that will follow Merkel’s exit, under Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, will continue the Merkel approach with the U.S. That approach will likely include continued close trade relations with China and Russia and tempered engagement with the U.S.
France with Emmanuel Macron….
The exit of Merkel could be an opening for the U.S. She had long courted France (not so successfully) as its partner in a greater counter balancing act to American influence in Europe.
The potential alliance between France and Germany would have found its strength in both the French and German desire for independent E.U. policies on China and Russia as well as differing stylistic approaches to other troubling states (as compared to the U.S.), including Iran, Libya, and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the alliance never found the necessary closeness required for co-leadership of Europe.
Thus France presents an interesting opportunity for the U.S., especially considering its foreign policy concerns and focus. First, the Biden administration has a stated intention to focus on Asia, most notably China, both from an economic and national security perspective.
Germany’s close ties to China automatically suggests that another partner in Europe is required to counterbalance Chinese economic and social expansion efforts. France’s friendly dance with Taiwan makes the country a more ideal partner for addressing the challenges of China.
It was also France that acquiesced to the U.S. request to include a statement on China in a NATO communique back in June, stating that China’s “stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order.”
Secondly, France has long been more aligned with the U.S on effort against Islamic terrorism. Where the U.S. wants to drawdown and limit its involvement in the “forever” wars, particularly in the Middle East (and Africa), France is also searching for a way to manage its military presence in troubled states.
The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has been underwritten by a pledge to conduct “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations via armed drones (for example in Afghanistan) to pursue terrorists while reducing the amount of people on the ground.
There is alignment with France who wants to be a diplomatic broker in some states, such as Libya and Mali, yet also decrease the presence of their forces on the ground, particularly in former colonies as part of a greater (symbolic) recognition of autonomy for those states as well as a concessional retreat from historical wrongs and crimes of colonialism.
For example, Macron is winding down bases in Mali though, at the same time, keeping approximately 5,000 soldiers in Sahel alongside American troops.
Thirdly, the U.S. public perspective (and policy in most instances) is that NATO and many other countries should bear a greater share of the national security burden. France favors a more autonomous E.U., especially one able to stand up to Russia, China and other outsiders. A more independent E.U. ideally would cover more of the financial bill for security in the region.
Lastly, Merkel’s absence should mean the experienced Macron can steer the use of the E.U.’s expansive economic, trade, and regulatory powers and script the development of the E.U.’s policy stance with China, Russia, etc. More E.U. sovereignty aligned with U.S. common interests works for both the heavy-Trump or light-Biden versions of “America First”.
Then, What Is The Issue?
Trust remains a challenge…the Australia submarine debacle is a perfect example of mismanaged friendship. U.S. and French operational cooperation on the battlefields in the Middle East and Africa suggests open dialogue on national security could be easier. The submarine deal is right for the U.S. but a private pre-warning to France could have quelled the discontent.
The U.S. and France should know that all marriages have challenges. But it is common interests (and enemies) that align couples. Keep the focus on Russia and China where there is significant alignment of interests, threats and frustration.
Support your partner and their voice on the public stage. The U.S. should trust France, especially as it assumes the presidency of the Council of the European Union in January 2022, to lead the development of a ‘sovereign’ E.U. A sovereign E.U. could be valuable to the U.S., in particular where that sovereignty also includes assuming a fair share of the policy and economic burden in combating global challenges. France should be able to build and coalesce other European states around certain causes better than the U.S. And, again, the absence of Merkel requires the ascension of another European personality. Macron’s independence – the recalling of ambassador to the U.S. as an example – is, at some level, ideal when the E.U. (and Europeans in general) is seeking to re-establish independence and strength on a global stage.
