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	<title>Venezuela &#8211; The Musings Of A Politics Junkie &amp; Closet Economist</title>
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		<title>Top Foreign Policy Issues Facing Next U.S. President on Day 1</title>
		<link>https://kurtdavisjr.com/top-foreign-policy-issues-facing-next-u-s-president-on-day-1-saudi-arabia-israel-gaza-palestine-venezuela-mexico-immigration-china-taiwan-india-russia-ukraine-south-korea/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=top-foreign-policy-issues-facing-next-u-s-president-on-day-1-saudi-arabia-israel-gaza-palestine-venezuela-mexico-immigration-china-taiwan-india-russia-ukraine-south-korea</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kurt L. Davis Jr.]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Aug 2024 17:01:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Latin America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East / Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Electric Vehicles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fentanyl]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mexico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RUssia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taiwan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Venezuela]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kurtdavisjr.com/?p=809</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The 2024 U.S. presidential election is in full swing with candidates talking economic policy but partially skirting round foreign policy challenges. The foreign policy debate has been limited with most commentary focused on whether the policy will be more “arrogant” or “predictable”, neither of which are informative descriptions for a candidate or directionally insightful as a strategy. The next U.S. president will face several key issues on day 1 and, while temperament can be part of the test, there is a question of policy answers and details...]]></description>
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<figure class="aligncenter size-full is-resized"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1000" height="667" src="http://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Harris-Trump.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-813" style="width:810px;height:auto" srcset="https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Harris-Trump.jpg 1000w, https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Harris-Trump-300x200.jpg 300w, https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Harris-Trump-768x512.jpg 768w, https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Harris-Trump-750x500.jpg 750w" sizes="(max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Kamala Harris, Vice President of the United States, on the left and Donald Trump, the former (45th) President of the United States, on the right (Photo Credit: Shutterstock)</figcaption></figure></div>


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<h4 class="wp-block-heading has-text-align-center"><strong style="font-style: italic;"><strong style="font-style: italic;">&#8230;</strong><em>Skirting foreign policy debates may work for this presidential campaign cycle, but the challenges are not going away</em></strong>&#8230;</h4>



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<p class="">The 2024 U.S. presidential election is in full swing with candidates talking economic policy but partially skirting round foreign policy challenges.</p>



<p class="">The foreign policy debate has been limited with most commentary focused on whether the policy will be more “arrogant” or “predictable”, neither of which are informative descriptions for a candidate or directionally insightful as a strategy.</p>



<p class="">The next U.S. president will face several key issues on day 1 and, while temperament can be part of the test, there is a question of policy answers and details<strong>.</strong><strong></strong></p>



<p class=""><strong>Venezuela: President Nicolás Maduro Goes or Stays?</strong><strong></strong></p>



<p class="">Migrants, migrants, migrants…it is a major issue in the U.S. political dialogue. About 263,000 Venezuelans crossed the U.S. border in 2023, up from roughly 190,000 in 2022. The root causes of this migration, including democratic breakdown, political and social oppression, and a lack of human rights, have seemingly become more ingrained with the latest election victory by President Nicolás Maduro.</p>



<p class="">The opposition, led by former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia, collected voting data that suggests it won nearly two-thirds of the vote. What does an unrecognized opposition victory mean? Can there be a negotiated exit for Maduro (rumored to have been offered by the U.S.)?&nbsp; With little hope of change, more Venezuelans will head for the U.S. southern border.</p>



<p class=""><strong>Palestine: Two State Solution?</strong><strong></strong></p>



<p class="">The war in Gaza is now entering month 11 with an elusive ceasefire agreement being discussed. The war has led to more than 40,000 deaths and the Gaza strip being relegated to “42 million tonnes of rubble.” An estimated 70% of housing has been damaged along with most hospitals and schools.</p>



<p class="">It comes as no surprise that the ceasefire discussion has an immediate follow-up question: how does the global “we” reconstruct Gaza? Most Palestinians have been displaced and it is not clear what they can return to without a clear reconstruction plan.</p>



<p class="">Furthermore, what is the ultimate solution? The two-state solution is widely accepted as the international solution, despite more and more Palestinians and Israelis discussing it with a sense of impossibility – how do you connect the Gaza Strip and the West Bank physically and politically?</p>



<p class=""><strong>Saudi Arabia and Israel: A Peace Deal?</strong><strong></strong></p>



<p class="">For months, Washington has said a deal to normalize diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel was near completion. Yet, there remains a few not-so-small stumbling blocks, such as a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. Saudi officials reportedly are content with an Israeli commitment to a two-state solution without the detailed specifics of a plan – meanwhile, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (commonly known as MBS) is reportedly concerned that there may be a threat upon his life if he accepts this security deal.</p>



<p class="">The deal could also falter without U.S. Senate support with numerous Democratic senators voicing opposition – a U.S. defense treaty (as part of the security pact) would require ratification from two-thirds of the Senate. Then there is the requirement of reducing security cooperation, such as weapon purchases and intelligence sharing, with China. There are leaders questioning whether the normalization deal is possible or worth the effort as it may not be the panacea that supporters imagine it. Nonetheless, if it does fall apart, then Washington will again need to reconsider how to engage both countries and find cooperation on an issue-by-issue basis? That may be even harder than finalizing the normalization deal.</p>



<p class=""><strong>India: U.S. Ally or Not?</strong><strong></strong></p>



<p class="">Washington continues to aggressively court India. Still. the prospects of properly “tying the proverbial knot” seems impossible with India focused more on a more non-traditional alliance with the U.S. India wants to avoid being dragged into the U.S. vortex of good and evil where sanctions would mean higher energy costs (as the Indian economy currently benefits from significantly discounted oil and coal from Russia) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi would uncomfortably be placed at the center of potential peace discussions between Russia and Ukraine. Modi, who made trips to Ukraine and Russia within weeks of each other, already signaled a lack of desire to be the messenger between the two countries.</p>



<p class="">India also has a complicated relationship with China due to a disputed border, China’s ties to Pakistan, an unequal trade relationship, and growing competition for political, social and economic power in Asia – Washington views this chasm as an opportunity, but relationships built on a common enemy are not as strong as relationships built on common ambitions and views. Over time, it will be important for the U.S. and India to bond on the latter.</p>



<p class=""><strong>Russia and Ukraine: A Never-ending War?</strong><strong></strong></p>



<p class="">The war in Ukraine has passed 30 months with fighting mostly stalled along the frontlines. A surprise Ukrainian incursion into Kursk created some physical movement, though the more significant outcome was the distraction created for Russian troops and the boosted morale for Ukrainian troops. There is the potential Ukraine finds a way to leverage the territory in a negotiated settlement with Russia.</p>



<p class="">Today, a negotiated settlement appears far away thus what is the ultimate path to peace? Can it even be negotiated or does one side have to surrender? A surrender is unlikely while a negotiation requires finding a credible mediator. The U.S. and China will struggle to be credible while India has said no. A Middle East country, like the UAE or Saudi Arabia, or an African country, such as South Africa could be an option.</p>



<p class="">Until then, will the U.S., Europe and other allies implement more sanctions, especially targeting countries that help Russia circumvent existing sanctions, as well as continue to supply heavy artillery and weapons? What happens to Ukrainian membership in NATO or access to the E.U.?</p>



<p class=""><strong>Mexico: Immigration and Fentanyl</strong><strong></strong></p>



<p class="">U.S.-Mexico relations benefit from “friend-shoring” with Mexico supplanting China as the U.S.’s top trading partner. A migrant and fentanyl problem, however, will test them. Mexico has turned into a chokepoint for migrants with U.S. policies, such as the “Remain in Mexico” program and Title 42 (a temporary pandemic-era law that was used to expel asylum-seekers), yet the issue has not turned into a political football in Mexican politics. President Biden’s recent executive orders, which further restricted the application of U.S. asylum, will put more pressure on Mexico to house migrants.</p>



<p class="">Even with less migrants crossing into the U.S., the fentanyl drug problem remains, despite producers using chemical precursors from China that are already subject to international controls. Some data suggests Mexico is doing less to stop the smuggling of fentanyl versus methamphetamines, which is more commonly sold within the country. What more can be done by countries to stem the fentanyl crisis? The status quo is not working.</p>



<p class=""><strong>China: Taiwan and Fentanyl</strong><strong></strong></p>



<p class="">Washington and Beijing have a complex bilateral relationship that is both economically interdependent and in competition. China arguably leads the global renewable race with its installed solar photovoltaic capacity, capturing of supply chains for critical minerals, and championing of EVs with big private producers like BYD. That reality drove the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, which included more than $300 billion allocated for energy and climate investment, and is the impetus for Senator Marco Rubio’s and Senator Mark Warner’s recently introduced bill to combat China’s “monopoly” on critical minerals and related supply chains.</p>



<p class="">The dispute over Taiwan crosses into this discussion with TSMC (officially Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) producing an estimated 90% of the world’s super-advanced semiconductor chips, which are used to power everything from smartphones to artificial intelligence applications. The U.S. requires access to these chips and is both promising to protect Taiwan if China attempts to retake control of the islands and passing legislation, like the CHIPS and Science Act, to strengthen production at home. Are all these bills enough? Tariffs are being tossed around as another piece of the solution. Lastly, let’s not forget the U.S. government claims China is subsidizing the manufacturing of the chemicals used by traffickers to make fentanyl. What can the U.S. do?</p>



<p class=""><strong>The Korean Peninsula: An Emerging Nuclear War?</strong><strong></strong></p>



<p class="">China and Taiwan may garner more attention, but the tension between the Koreas cannot be ignored. Polls show that a majority of South Koreans support the pursuit of nuclear weapons with the growing nuclear arsenal in North Korea and a sense of uncertainty around long-term support and nuclear deterrence from the U.S. (despite a recent agreement between the two allies on joint nuclear deterrence guidelines.) An arms race would create instability with the world hoping untested leaders on both sides do not prematurely hit the nuclear button. This would be a new political realm for the Koreas.</p>



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		<title>Joe Biden and South America: What to Expect in  Key Countries?</title>
		<link>https://kurtdavisjr.com/joe-biden-and-south-america-what-to-expect-in-certain-key-countries/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=joe-biden-and-south-america-what-to-expect-in-certain-key-countries</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kurt L. Davis Jr.]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Nov 2020 07:31:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Latin America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alberto Fernández]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America First]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Argentina]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brazil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Colombia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economic cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iván Duque Márquez]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jair Bolsonaro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joe Biden]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nicolás Maduro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Venezuela]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kurtdavisjr.com/?p=354</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[A Biden administration should be expected to be a partner to Latin America due to Biden’s prior enthusiasm and interest in the region. That said, increased diplomatic communication and engagement does not necessarily suggest a major shift in policy...]]></description>
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<h4 class="has-text-align-center wp-block-heading" id="trade-commerce-and-economic-growth-why-discuss-other-things-at-least-for-now"><strong><em><em><em><em><em>Trade, commerce, and economic growth…why discuss other things, at least, for now?</em></em></em></em></em></strong></h4>



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<p>We are less than 60 days away from inauguration day for president-elect Joe Biden. Some South American politicians and activists, including Argentinian President Alberto Fernández and Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou, seemingly cannot wait for that day. Others, such as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, may be more hesitant. Both sides should be excited and cautious. </p>



<p>A Biden administration should be expected to be a partner to South America due to Biden’s prior enthusiasm and interest in the region. Still, increased diplomatic communication and engagement does not necessarily suggest a major shift in policy. For example, President Donald Trump’s Growth in the Americas initiative, which promotes collaboration with private industry to fund infrastructure projects across Latin America and the Caribbean should continue. This conspicuous response to China’s expansion into the region will likely have support within a Biden administration and Congress, especially with countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador in South America already signed onto the initiative. </p>



<p>Similar economic initiatives in the region could be low-hanging fruit for continuity. Yet, the Biden administration will also have to confront the language of (or change the tone on) tariffs and economic threats when engaging South America as well as steer a pathway to engaging on democracy and the drug trade in the region. Democracy as a policy does not always go well…despots and autocrats can win elections too. And the drug trade is, as we all know, an incessantly ongoing touchy subject that has cost many real (and political) lives in its path. Thus, when looking at the key countries in the region (i.e., Brazil, Argentina Colombia, and Venezuela) for a Biden administration, plotting a strategy that is focused on economic growth and trade and layered with <em>capitalistic</em> market-friendly policies may be the winning mix for change in the region (and at home).</p>



<p>A deeper exploration of U.S. engagement with these key countries largely suggests that there may be a change in tone but not exactly a change in policy thinking.</p>



<p style="font-size:26px"><strong>Brazil</strong></p>



<p class="has-medium-font-size"><em>The “Trump of Tropics” meets the anti-Trump president…</em></p>



<p>It is not hard to imagine how the relationship between Joe Biden and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro could get off to a rocky start. Joe Biden has publicly criticized the environmental policies of Bolsonaro with poignant attacks on the response to the Amazon fires by the Bolsonaro administration. Biden went as far as telling the <em>Americas Quarterly</em> earlier this year that “If Brazil fails to be a responsible custodian of the Amazon rainforest, then my administration will rally the world to ensure the environment is protected.” It is expected that Biden will bring the U.S. back to the Paris climate deal thus it is easy to think he will not back down on protecting the Amazon. Also, during the campaign, he proposed a $20 billion global initiative to protect the Amazon to which Bolsonaro classically responded that he “does not accept bribes.” Trump, at the time, tweeted his support for Bolsonaro…it is best to assume the Amazon and climate change may not be the best topics for dinner conservation for Biden and Bolsonaro.</p>



<p>A Biden administration may find more alignment with Bolsonaro by pursuing a stronger economic partnership. At some level, Trump elevated Brazil above Argentina when he voiced support for Brazil to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) before Argentina. The Trump administration followed up the support with a limited trade agreement to facilitate commerce between the countries, strengthen regulatory practices and cooperation, and fight corruption. A Biden administration could fare well to follow the path that Trump’s administration was, in practice, outlining for engagement with Brazil. </p>



<p>Brazil’s desire to join the OECD, which currently only has four &nbsp;Latin American members (i.e., Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, ad Mexico) amongst its 38 member states, will force the country to adopt some economic reforms it would not pursue in ordinary due course. In other words, the desire to join the OECD can be similar to the desire of some European countries to join the European Union (EU)…some countries will truly change the laws and rules of its country to align with the greater body for admission. Though, the EU also shows how some countries adopt rules for admission then backtrack once admitted (but let us ignore that for now). Maybe walking down the OECD aisle with Brazil could be very beneficial for the United States. Brazil is the ninth largest economy in the world and the largest trading partner in South America for the U.S. Simply put, a Brazil with more market-friendly policies and regulation, increased governance, and more economic alignment with the U.S. surely cannot be a bad thing.</p>



<p style="font-size:26px"><strong>Argentina</strong></p>



<p class="has-medium-font-size"><em>The marriage of a leftist and a liberal…probably not</em></p>



<p>Argentinian President Alberto Fernández took some relief in watching Biden win this presidential election. After Fernández won his election in October 2019, Trump was quick to warn Fernández that his administration should not be friendly with other leftist leaders in the region, including Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and former Bolivian President Evo Morales. Furthermore, Trump appointee Mauricio Claver-Carone, then-senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs at the National Security Council and now President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), did not attend Fernández’s inauguration ceremony reportedly after learning that a Maduro official would be attending the inauguration. Biden has long critiqued the nomination of Claver-Carone to the IDB as being “ideological” more than anything else, especially as Claver-Carone is the first U.S. head of the bank. Normal tradition is to nominate a Latin American to the post. </p>



<p>Be that as it may, Biden’s critique of the IDB nomination has little to do with Argentina…that reality underscores the probable storyline for a Biden administration with Argentina. There will be some dialogue between the countries to facilitate increased commerce and trade. That dialogue may include discussing the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) $44 billion credit line to Argentina. Beyond that, Argentina will potentially be an afterthought with the Biden administration offering kind words and support but hesitant to get its hands dirty in the country’s politics and economics. Maybe there is a little discussion on clean energy and oil drilling but that will be a side show to the larger internal discussion in Argentina on Argentina fixing Argentina’s economy…i.e., the next couple years will not be about the U.S. or Biden when it comes to Argentinian politics.</p>



<p style="font-size:26px"><strong>Colombia</strong></p>



<p class="has-medium-font-size"><em>President Iván Duque Márquez is not President Juan Manuel Santos…time to make a new friend</em></p>



<p>Colombia has long been a part of the Biden foreign policy or, better yet, the “keystone” of U.S. policy in Latin America, as Biden notably described it early this year in an op-ed. Cynics will say the words were patent pandering for Hispanic votes in a tight presidential election. But that critique would be unfair to Biden, who spent significant time as senator (and then-ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) securing funding for Plan Colombia, an initiative which provided money to combat the drug trade in country.</p>



<p>Biden also supported Colombia’s efforts to negotiate a peace deal under then-President Juan Manuel Santos with members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Now, the administration of President Iván Duque Márquez, if not actively undercutting the peace deal as suggested by some critics, is not precisely helping that peace deal to be successful. Duque has many Colombian politicians who oppose the peace deal and the concessions to the FARC…some of those politicians were happy to openly show support for Trump’s re-election campaign. Also, lockdowns, shutdowns and economic suffering are also a major hinderance to a successful peace process. All this makes for a lot of work on day 1 for a Biden administration.</p>



<p>If Biden wants to be active in re-engaging Colombia on the peace deal and beyond, he may want to start with facilitating stronger commerce, trade, and economic growth and working with the country to fight covid-19. Helping everyday Colombian pockets is a better first step to peace than anything else in the country. If anything, Biden may want to sidestep discussions on coca cultivation and drugs in Colombia in the initial days…it will have to be a topic of discussion at some point. A Biden administration will not want to appear soft on the drug trade nor as aggressive as Trump, who favored resuming aerial eradication of coca crops. That is not an easy policy balance to maintain (nor broach in the early days) versus simply talking covid-19 and economic recovery…the latter of which proved successful, at least, in the U.S. election.</p>



<p style="font-size:26px"><strong>Venezuela</strong></p>



<p class="has-medium-font-size"><em>Time to negotiate for a transitional government?</em></p>



<p>Venezuela is always part of the Latin American discussion. But observers may notice that there is not much to say here. Biden is not a socialist (as if that really needs to be stated) and will remain a formidable opposition to Venezuelan socialist President Nicolás Maduro. Still, it is not clear how a Biden administration will approach Venezuelan opposition politician Juan Guaido, who declared himself the country’s interim president in January 2019 with some international recognition but failed to push Maduro from power. Trump ardently backed Guaido and refused to concede anything to Maduro. A Biden administration, on the other hand, may try to negotiate a deal with Maduro if the opportunity presents itself. It is hard to say a potential deal is outright wrong, but many Venezuelans and outsiders will be skeptical of any deal for a transition of power in the country. Venezuelans also are not looking for symbolic political change. Regardless of political leanings, the paradoxical reality of an oil rich country with staggering inflation and poverty requires economic solutions to the everyday Venezuelan life. It is not clear that a transition government or split government can deliver that change…but then again, it is also clear that the current stalemate is essentially a Maduro presidency which is obviously not helping the situation. A true step to getting Maduro out of power would be the equivalent of winning the presidential lottery for approval ratings for the Biden administration. Misplaying your leverage and strengthening Maduro’s position, however, could be an outright catastrophe for a Biden administration. </p>



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