<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/" > <channel> <title>Syria – The Musings Of A Politics Junkie & Closet Economist</title> <atom:link href="https://kurtdavisjr.com/tag/syria/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /> <link>https://kurtdavisjr.com</link> <description></description> <lastBuildDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 17:57:57 +0000</lastBuildDate> <language>en-US</language> <sy:updatePeriod> hourly </sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency> 1 </sy:updateFrequency> <generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.2</generator> <item> <title>The Fall Of Assad: Five Hot Takes</title> <link>https://kurtdavisjr.com/the-fall-of-assad-five-hot-takes-washington-times-syria-u-s-turkey-trump-obama/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-fall-of-assad-five-hot-takes-washington-times-syria-u-s-turkey-trump-obama</link> <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kurt L. Davis Jr.]]></dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 17:57:53 +0000</pubDate> <category><![CDATA[Middle East / Asia]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Bashar Assad]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Joe Biden]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Obama]]></category> <category><![CDATA[RUssia]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category> <category><![CDATA[United States]]></category> <guid isPermaLink="false">https://kurtdavisjr.com/?p=880</guid> <description><![CDATA[The dramatic fall of Syrian President Bashar Assad marks a watershed moment in the tumultuous history of the Middle East. Mr. Assad’s regime, sustained for years by the external lifelines of Russia and Iran, finally crumbled under the weight of its contradictions and the enduring pressures of civil war. For the United States, his fall underscores critical lessons about our foreign policy failures and raises urgent questions about the road ahead...]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-image"> <figure class="aligncenter size-full is-resized"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="885" height="516" src="https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-881" style="width:810px;height:auto" srcset="https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad.jpg 885w, https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-300x175.jpg 300w, https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-768x448.jpg 768w, https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Assad-750x437.jpg 750w" sizes="(max-width: 885px) 100vw, 885px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Syrian President Bashar Assad illustration by Linas Garsys / The Washington Times </figcaption></figure></div> <hr class="wp-block-separator has-css-opacity"/> <h4 class="wp-block-heading has-text-align-center"><strong style="font-style: italic;"><strong style="font-style: italic;">…</strong><em>History will not be kind to those who fail to act decisively</em><em>…</em></strong></h4> <hr class="wp-block-separator has-css-opacity"/> <p><strong><em>This was originally published by </em></strong><a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/dec/9/fall-assad-five-hot-takes/" data-type="link" data-id="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4306629-saudi-arabia-wants-the-indian-premier-league-why-is-there-no-discussion-of-sportswashing/"><em>The Washington Times.</em></a></p> <p>The dramatic fall of Syrian President Bashar Assad marks a watershed moment in the tumultuous history of the Middle East. Mr. Assad’s regime, sustained for years by the external lifelines of <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/russia/">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iran/">Iran</a>, finally crumbled under the weight of its contradictions and the enduring pressures of civil war. For the United States, his fall underscores critical lessons about our foreign policy failures and raises urgent questions about the road ahead.</p> <h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>1. Obama’s ’red line’ fiasco proved a catalyst for prolonged suffering.</strong></h2> <p>President Barack Obama’s 2013 declaration of a “red line” against Mr. Assad’s use of chemical weapons was supposed to be a moment of moral and strategic clarity. Instead, it symbolized indecision and ineffectiveness when the U.S. failed to follow through.</p> <p>This hesitation sent a message to Mr. Assad and, more importantly, <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/russia/">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iran/">Iran</a>, that American threats lacked credibility. Their subsequent intervention prolonged Mr. Assad’s survival and turned <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria</a> into a battlefield for global and regional powers.</p> <p>The swift collapse of Mr. Assad’s regime in the absence of Russian and Iranian support highlights how fragile his hold on power was all along. A resolute and timely U.S. response in 2013 could have changed the course of Syrian history and spared millions from the horrors of war. Mr. Obama’s legacy in <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria</a> will remain a cautionary tale of what happens when rhetoric outpaces action.</p> <h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>2. Biden’s slow foreign policy leaves Israel and Turkey steering the ship.</strong></h2> <p>As Mr. Assad’s regime fell apart in a matter of days, the Biden administration has been cautious to approach the microphone (or speak with authority). This vacuum of American initiative or even voice allows regional powers such as Israel and Turkey to dictate the terms of <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria’s</a> future.</p> <p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s proactive strategy — including precision strikes on Iranian targets in <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria</a> and swiftly moving troops into the buffer zone in the Golan Heights in the aftermath of Mr. Assad’s fall — will outpace Washington’s slow-moving policy apparatus.</p> <p>Meanwhile, Turkey’s maneuvers in northern <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria</a>, particularly against Kurdish groups, reflect Ankara’s ability to pursue its agenda without significant U.S. oversight. The Biden administration has yet to articulate a cohesive strategy, leaving the U.S. playing second fiddle to regional actors focused on shaping the post-Assad landscape in ways that may not align with American interests.</p> <h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>3. The battle for <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria</a> has just begun.</strong></h2> <p>Mr. Assad’s fall does not signify peace for <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria</a>. Instead, it starts a new and perhaps more complex conflict. The Islamic State group, emboldened by the power vacuum, is already said to be resurging. Kurdish groups, including the People’s Defense Units, or YPG, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, are scrambling to secure their position against both IS and a potentially aggressive Turkey.</p> <p>Ankara’s opposition to Kurdish autonomy complicates U.S. efforts to support its Kurdish allies, which were pivotal in the fight against IS. A Turkish-Kurdish conflict could undermine regional stability and inadvertently strengthen IS. The U.S. will need to balance Turkey’s NATO status with the need to protect Kurdish forces — a dilemma that risks alienating both allies.</p> <h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>4. Trump’s noninterventionist doctrine finds vindication.</strong></h2> <p>President-elect Donald Trump’s insistence in the last couple of days that the U.S. stay out of <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria’s</a> quagmire now seems prescient. Mr. Trump’s critics often deride his reluctance to engage in regime change or deep military intervention as isolationist. But Mr. Assad’s overtures in the last few days to the West, widely viewed as desperate and insincere after the rapid fall of his regime, vindicate Mr. Trump’s statement: “This is not our fight.”</p> <p>The chaos following Mr. Assad’s fall will demonstrate the wisdom of restraint: <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria</a> remains a deeply fractured nation, and any attempt at nation-building would likely be futile and costly. The battle between IS and Kurdish forces for power will raise both the financial and human costs of nation-building.</p> <h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>5. <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/russia/">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iran/">Iran</a> are diminished, creating both opportunities and risks.</strong></h2> <p>The weakening of Mr. Assad’s key backers — <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/russia/">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iran/">Iran</a> — has reshaped the Middle East’s power dynamics. <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/russia/">Russia</a>, bogged down in its war in Ukraine, was unable to maintain its military and economic support for Mr. Assad.</p> <p><a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/iran/">Iran</a>, meanwhile, has been battered by relentless Israeli operations targeting its assets in <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria</a>, Lebanon and beyond, including the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. While the diminishing influence of these adversaries creates openings for the U.S. and its allies, it also leaves a dangerous void. The absence of Russian and Iranian control could lead to greater instability, with extremist groups and competing militias vying for dominance.</p> <h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Going forward without Assad</strong></h2> <p>Mr. Assad’s fall offers a moment of reflection for U.S. policymakers. Mr. Obama’s failure to enforce his “red line” set the stage for years of prolonged conflict and suffering. President Biden’s slow response in the foreign policy realm has ceded foreign policy initiative (and power) to Israel and Turkey, exposing a lack of strategic vision from the United States.</p> <p>In contrast, Mr. Trump’s call not to entangle the United States in <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/syria/">Syria’s</a> complexities now appears farsighted. He was the major voice on the issue as the Biden administration slowly developed a view.</p> <p>As the Middle East grapples with the aftermath of Mr. Assad’s regime, the U.S. must revisit whether it will continue to watch from the sidelines or reassert itself (at least verbally) as a shaper of regional stability. The stakes are high, and history will not be kind to those who fail to act decisively.</p> <hr class="wp-block-separator has-css-opacity"/> <p></p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item> <title>Israel’s Expanding War and the Echoes of the American ‘Surge’ Strategy</title> <link>https://kurtdavisjr.com/israels-expanding-war-and-the-echoes-of-the-american-surge-strategy-dc-journal/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=israels-expanding-war-and-the-echoes-of-the-american-surge-strategy-dc-journal</link> <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kurt L. Davis Jr.]]></dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2024 02:14:00 +0000</pubDate> <category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Middle East / Asia]]></category> <category><![CDATA[United States]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Afghanistan]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category> <guid isPermaLink="false">https://kurtdavisjr.com/?p=848</guid> <description><![CDATA[Israel has dramatically escalated its military operations, extending beyond Gaza to include strikes in Lebanon, Yemen and Syria. This expansion marks a significant shift in strategy that borrows heavily from the American playbook while tailoring it to Israel’s unique geopolitical context. As the conflict intensifies, it’s crucial to examine the implications of this approach, not just for the Middle East but for global security and economic stability...]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-image"> <figure class="aligncenter size-full is-resized"><img decoding="async" width="300" height="300" src="https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/bigstock-Haifa-Israel-April-475176925-300x300-1.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-849" style="width:578px;height:578px" srcset="https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/bigstock-Haifa-Israel-April-475176925-300x300-1.jpg 300w, https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/bigstock-Haifa-Israel-April-475176925-300x300-1-150x150.jpg 150w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></figure></div> <p class=""></p> <p class=""><strong><em>This originally appeared in <a href="https://dcjournal.com/israels-expanding-war-and-the-echoes-of-the-american-surge-strategy/" data-type="link" data-id="https://dcjournal.com/israels-expanding-war-and-the-echoes-of-the-american-surge-strategy/">DCJournal.com</a></em></strong></p> <p class="">In recent weeks, Israel has dramatically escalated its military operations, extending beyond Gaza to include strikes in Lebanon, Yemen and Syria. This expansion marks a significant shift in strategy that borrows heavily from the American playbook while tailoring it to Israel’s unique geopolitical context. As the conflict intensifies, it’s crucial to examine the implications of this approach, not just for the Middle East but for global security and economic stability.</p> <p class="">Israel’s campaign bears striking similarities to the U.S. “surge” strategy employed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like the American approach, Israel aims to use overwhelming force to neutralize threats quickly and create conditions for long-term stability. However, Israel’s version is more focused and time-sensitive, reflecting the immediacy of the threats it faces.</p> <p class="">The Israeli government, still reeling from the October 7 Hamas attack, has concluded that the status quo is no longer tenable. This shift in thinking mirrors the U.S. response to 9/11 when the tolerance for terrorist safe havens evaporated overnight. But while the United States had the luxury of distance, Israel is grappling with threats on its doorstep, necessitating a more urgent and comprehensive response.</p> <p class="">Unlike the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel is not seeking a prolonged occupation or nation-building exercise. Instead, it’s pursuing a strategy of surgical precision aimed at dismantling the leadership and capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah. This approach reflects a growing weariness with the “hearts and minds” doctrine that has often proved challenging (some may say ineffective) in counterterrorism efforts.</p> <p class="">Focusing on precision and speed is not just a tactical choice but a strategic necessity. Israel understands that a drawn-out conflict could erode international support and strain its own resources. By emphasizing targeted strikes and limited ground incursions, Israel hopes to achieve its security objectives while minimizing civilian casualties and avoiding the quagmire of long-term occupation. Can surgical strikes alone create the conditions for lasting peace.</p> <p class="">At the heart of Israel’s expanded campaign is Iran. Tehran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, coupled with its nuclear ambitions, represents an existential threat to Israel. The current offensive can be seen as an indirect confrontation with Iran aimed at weakening its proxies and deterring further aggression.</p> <p class="">However, this strategy carries significant risks. Any miscalculation could lead to direct conflict with Iran, potentially drawing in other regional powers and escalating into a wider war. The international community, particularly the United States, must tread carefully in its support for Israel, balancing the need for deterrence against the risk of uncontrolled escalation.</p> <p class="">The potential economic consequences of this conflict cannot be overstated. Any disruption to oil supplies from the Middle East could send shockwaves through the global economy. With the U.S. presidential election on the horizon, the effect on energy prices could become a pivotal issue, influencing domestic politics and international relations.</p> <p class="">Policymakers in Washington must be prepared for various scenarios, including the possibility of Israeli strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure. The most discussed target is the Kharg oil terminal, which handles 80 percent to 90 percent of oil exports, most of which are destined for China. Such an action would spike oil prices and lead to retaliatory measures that further destabilize the region and global markets.</p> <p class="">As Israel pursues this high-stakes strategy, it must maintain clear objectives and an exit strategy. The goal should be to neutralize immediate threats and create a more favorable security environment, not to become entangled in an open-ended conflict.</p> <p class="">For the United States, the challenge lies in supporting its ally while preventing further escalation. This will require deft diplomacy, leveraging relationships with other regional powers to contain the conflict and push for a sustainable resolution.</p> <p class="">The international community must also play a role in mediating the current crisis and addressing the underlying issues that fuel conflict in the region. This includes renewed efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a comprehensive approach to curbing Iran’s destabilizing activities.</p> <p class="">Israel’s expanded war represents a calculated gamble to reshape the security landscape of the Middle East. While the strategy draws from American experiences, it’s tailored to Israel’s unique position and threats.</p> <p class="">As the situation unfolds, we must remember the lessons of past conflicts. No matter how precise, military action alone rarely solves deep-seated political and social issues. For lasting peace, Israel and its allies must couple their military strategy with robust diplomatic efforts and a clear vision for post-conflict reconstruction and governance.</p> <p class="">The echoes of American strategy in Israel’s actions are clear. Now, we must hope that Israel has learned not just from America’s initial interventions but from the complex, often painful aftermath of those conflicts. The stability of the Middle East — and perhaps the world — may depend on it.</p> <hr class="wp-block-separator has-css-opacity"/> <p class=""></p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item> <title>Lebanon’s Search For A Solution in 2021</title> <link>https://kurtdavisjr.com/lebanons-tragedy-economy-politics-covid-19-solution/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=lebanons-tragedy-economy-politics-covid-19-solution</link> <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kurt L. Davis Jr.]]></dc:creator> <pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2021 10:31:25 +0000</pubDate> <category><![CDATA[Middle East / Asia]]></category> <category><![CDATA[2021]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Covid-19]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Economic Recovery]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Port Explosion]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Saad Hariri]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category> <guid isPermaLink="false">https://kurtdavisjr.com/?p=396</guid> <description><![CDATA[Lebanon has long swept its challenges under the rug and celebrated its successes. But the explosion back on August 4th in the port area of Beirut—the capital of Lebanon—, in a figurative and physical sense, unveiled a tomb of hidden treasures and misfortunes of years past. Yet the tragedy of the blast was it not only took so many lives, but its revelations of treasures and misfortunes were not exactly new...]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[ <div class="wp-block-image is-style-default"><figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><img decoding="async" src="https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Lebanon-FT.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-398" width="580" height="326" srcset="https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Lebanon-FT.jpg 700w, https://kurtdavisjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Lebanon-FT-300x169.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 580px) 100vw, 580px" /><figcaption> (Photo Credit: Hamzeh/EPA/Shutterstock)</figcaption></figure></div> <hr class="wp-block-separator"/> <h4 class="has-text-align-center wp-block-heading"><strong><em>Dispersing with the political and economic remnants of civil war</em>…</strong></h4> <hr class="wp-block-separator"/> <div style="height:20px" aria-hidden="true" class="wp-block-spacer"></div> <p>This is not Lebanon. This is Lebanon. Maybe both statements are true.</p> <p>The hope, the destruction, and the hope again…or is it the destruction, the hope, and the destruction again?</p> <p>Lebanon has long swept its challenges under the rug and celebrated its successes. But the explosion back on August 4<sup>th</sup> in the port area of Beirut—the capital of Lebanon—, in a figurative and physical sense, unveiled a tomb of hidden treasures and misfortunes of years past. Yet the tragedy of the blast was it not only took so many lives, but its revelations of treasures and misfortunes were not exactly new.</p> <p>The treasures of Lebanon are its people and culture, and the resilience that keeps the people and culture fastened together. It is hard not to know these treasures or hear about them if you are to know Lebanon and have Lebanese friends. The fears are also known—political induration, economic and financial crisis, and the unavoidable foreign influence—yet they are danced around and skipped over in many conversations. Thus, the mystery of the entire situation is how does anyone, after the explosion, pretend the treasures easily outweigh the misfortunes (especially as the people continue to exit for other countries).</p> <p>More than four months later, the Lebanese diaspora has returned home for the holiday season to find a country still searching for a new way. Many visiting Lebanese diaspora are young(er), employed and idealistic, looking out at a local public that is increasingly old(er), unemployed, and decreasingly optimistic. This is not how their parents described Lebanon in its past days. The stories of today describe a grim reality on the ground…thus what is to be changed in the country if the stories are to resemble the past optimism of their parents’ tales.</p> <p class="has-medium-font-size"><strong>A Civil War Chameleon</strong><strong></strong></p> <p class="has-normal-font-size"><em>The Civil War That Never Ended But Adjusted</em></p> <p>More than 45 years ago, in April 1975, the Lebanese civil war broke out. The war lasted 15 years, taking more than 150,000 lives, injuring more than 300,000, and leading to the mass emigration of Lebanese. The end of the war was equally catastrophic with both Israel and Syria making best efforts to control the country. A series of political assassinations and the continuous picking at old political scabs fueled further instability in the country. It was the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on Valentine’s Day in 2005 by a suicide truck bomb in Beirut that ultimately made Syria quit its occupation of the country. A senior member of Hezbollah was convicted for the planning of the assassination by an UN-funded special tribunal in the Hague back in July last year. A new war with Israel would erupt in 2006…for many Lebanese (and Israelis), this was only a continuation of the strained relationship that has soiled regional peace efforts for decades. The uprising in Syria in 2011 further picked at old wounds as Syrian refugees flooded into Lebanon for safety.</p> <p>Elections and protest movements are equally both synonymous with Lebanese politics and can function as a never-ending extension of the Lebanese civil war. The country existed without a president for about 29 months until October 31, 2016 when the Lebanese Parliament elected Michel Aoun after 40 failed attempts to fill the post. Various political parties undermined previous efforts to fill the vacancy with boycotts that prevented the necessary quorum for a vote. Following the 2016 election, President Aoun reappointed Saad Hariri as prime minister. Hariri previously served as prime minister from 2009 to 2011. He would unexpectedly resign on November 4, 2017 in a televised statement from Saud Arabia with unabated references to Iran and Hezbollah’s interference and influence in the greater Middle East politics and fears of assassination. </p> <p>Then Hariri, after a series of maneuvers and failed attempts to leave Saudi Arabia, would find his way to France to meet French President Emmanuel Macron and then back to Beirut where he suspended his resignation on November 21<sup>st</sup> and fully rescinded it on December 5<sup>th</sup>. Hariri would later announce another resignation in October 2019 following a series of street protests by the Lebanese public against a lack of transparency and accountability in government. He would leave office when Hassan Diab, the former education minister, was appointed to prime minister on January 21, 2020 and then be reappointed as prime minister on October 22<sup>nd</sup> after Diab resigned following the aforementioned explosion at the port. </p> <p>Lastly, the most recent parliamentary elections due for 2013 did not happen until May 2018 with the March 8<sup>th</sup> coalition, a coalition of political parties and independents united by a pro-Syria stance and allied with Hezbollah, taking a majority share of the power. The March 8 Alliance and the March 14 Alliance—a coalition of political parties and independents united by an anti-Syria stance—both formed in 2005 are manifestations of the ongoing alliances from the civil war codified into contemporary Lebanese politics.</p> <p class="has-medium-font-size"><strong>The “Slicing the Cake” Nature of Lebanese Politics</strong><strong></strong></p> <p class="has-normal-font-size"><em>Political Power Sharing and Patronage</em></p> <p>So many in Lebanon grew up being told that Lebanon’s political system was necessary to protect the country. The UN-brokered Taif Agreement and related agreements following the end of the civil war was explicit in terms with a pre-assigned number of seats in the Lebanese Parliament to each of the different religious groups and sects. Unsurprisingly, political parties have been designed around these groups to ensure political power and mobilize voting blocks. Thus, although more religiously diverse than its Middle Eastern neighbors as well as having a very sizeable Christian population, Lebanon cannot escape the very palpable Sunni-Shia sectarian divide that permeates the politics of other predominantly Muslim nations in the region. </p> <p>Furthermore, the selection of candidates and subsequent voting is filtered through the same religious lens. Candidates are generally selected along religious fidelity with repeat selection of candidates for parliament by elder Lebanese which generally frustrates young Lebanese. The patronage system for cabinet posts, jobs and so on consequently remain dominated by specific families. Voters, especially younger voters, complain about the results, but the rules generally ensure the same outcome or, at least, prevents things from changing. The “system” also finds strength through continued emigration of talented Lebanese, who, in a figurative sense, are invited to send and spend money in Lebanon to support a fragile economic state but should stay out of politics. As a result, the protestors on the street are increasingly younger and mobilized by weakened social services and a troubled economy, ultimately exhibited by the country’s sovereign default last year.</p> <p>The apportionment and later subdividing of the spoils of patronage is a rather limited course of action for reversing the sectarian challenges. In other words, the “slicing the cake” style of politics has created an outwardly image of a functioning political system while mistrust percolates among religious sects and the greater Lebanese population. And, as the economic cake and associated positions of political power shrink, it is increasingly hard to find agreement on how to share responsibility and rewards. The pie is also shrinking as state-owned enterprises labor through economic turmoil caused by both mismanagement and the economic demise of the state. In the past, the state could financially engineer higher returns for investors and citizens willing to lend their dollars to the state. Today, both markets and Lebanese citizens are backing away.</p> <p class="has-medium-font-size"><strong>The IMF is Not a Miracle Worker</strong><strong></strong></p> <p class="has-normal-font-size"><em>The Deeper Problems and Challenges</em></p> <p>Lebanon’s economic challenges are not new. The country has regularly walked a tightrope with its sovereign balance sheet and avoided collapse with some form of financial sticky plaster from Middle Eastern neighbors or the market at the last minute. Yet the sovereign default last year completely exposed the bleeding in the system, with a shortage of foreign currency, an unclear strategy for attracting additional foreign currency, and an unceasing impatience and disdain from the public for the financial system in its entirety. A number of economists inside and outside the country supported the country defaulting on its debt with one common theme underlying their thinking: Lebanon needed to start over from scratch.</p> <p>Now, from “scratch” is hard unless you can blow up the entire system which is complicated for several reasons. First, decades of extracting income from rent-based sectors, including banking, real estate, and remittances to fund imports and consumption has emptied the coffers of the government as well as frustrated that small group still willing to fund the government. International markets have turned off the tap while neighboring countries show some willingness to finance the country only if that money can come with some political fidelity which Lebanon cannot offer within today’s politics. Secondly, the financial sector, in particular the banks, cannot find the usual support from the Lebanese population. Local Lebanese have lost significant wealth and buying power with the plunge of the Lebanese pound to roughly 8,000 to 9,000 pounds per dollar (versus the peg rate of 1,500) and have been hammered economically by covid-19 at home. Lebanese diaspora outside the country struggle to bet on the resilience and recovery of the country and choose to safekeep their money elsewhere across the globe. </p> <p>The IMF accordingly will struggle to employ the normal tactics in its reform toolbox. Currency devaluation… already done. Shrink the public sector…that could work but the local population is already combating inflation near 60% and struggling to pay for basic goods and services. Thus, the stripping of subsidies on energy and gasoline alongside food products ostensibly seems impossible today. Lastly, the focus on fiscal consolidation is not necessarily an easily digestible medicinal pill for a country that requires real economic growth, i.e. beyond infrastructure spending at the government level or inflow of dollar bank deposits from Lebanese both of which are unlikely in the short term in today’s environment</p> <p class="has-medium-font-size"><strong>“Falling on the Sword” to Save the Country</strong><strong></strong></p> <p class="has-normal-font-size"><em>Looking Back at Turkey in the 2000s and De Klerk in the early 1990s</em></p> <p>Lebanon may require the most extreme series of reforms. That said, the likely initiator of such reforms will likely not have long-term political survival. Consider the case of Turkish economic crisis in 2000s. The IMF provided more than $11 billion in loans while the state sold 51% stake of Turkish Airlines with advertisements placed in newspapers to attract buyers. Lebanon will require major loans to fund economic growth as foreign investors—similar to the experience in Turkey in the late 1990s—are reluctant to return to the country today. That said, Turkey became indebted to the IMF and, in the view of some critics, was placed at the mercy of the IMF’s political <em>and </em>social willpower. Additionally, some treasured Turkey state assets were no longer fully owned by the state…privatizing Lebanese state assets is already a delicate subject. </p> <p>Despite all these efforts in Turkey, the ruling party could not prevent the landslide victory of the AKP led by current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2002. This point is to say the system may need its F.W. de Klerk reform moment. De Klerk remains a controversial figure in South African history. He was the leader of the Afrikaner ethnic National Party (disbanded in 1997) yet he also later dismantled apartheid with universal suffrage to the South African population. He would win the Nobel Peace Prize for figuratively falling on the sword for the National Party’s historic wrongs and upending the system that maintained its white-minority rule. Lebanese politics may require several De Klerk moments…absent that, a new inflow of foreign capital or sale of state assets may not be enough to calm the angst of the young Lebanese and beyond, especially if an economic recovery only ultimately reinforces the old political system. Every party runs out of cake to eat and share at some point…or better said, a political system that sustains itself solely on perfectly allocating the spoils of war is bound to continuously falter and ultimately fail unless it can evolve and change (the jury is still out on Lebanon).</p> <hr class="wp-block-separator"/> <p></p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> </channel> </rss>